Bond
Outlook [by bridport
& cie, September 24th 2003]
We were looking for an end-summer breakout, and seem to have found
it in the G7 meeting last week admitting that the world economic
imbalances are unsustainable and rebalancing demands a weaker dollar and
stronger Asian currencies. The strengthening of the yen is a very positive
development, not least because it takes some of the pressure off the euro,
which is getting too strong for its own good. Japan has two reasons to
back off its "cheap yen" policy: one is that it is hard to be a member of
the G7 and totally ignore the other six and the IMF; the other is that
capital movements in Japan are not entirely controlled by the Bank of
Japan (the private sector and foreigners have their word to say!).
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The adjustment of three legs of exchange rates USD/EUR/YEN is a
very positive phenomenon, but real rebalancing requires a fourth leg: RMB
(China). While the West can "get at" Japan, China is a far more difficult
case. The Renminbi is not freely convertible and the Bank of China really
does control the exchange in an almost absolute sense. There is pressure
on China, partly effective on the Hong Kong dollar, but even that currency
is far from floating, while the Bank of China just obeys its recalcitrant
Government. Nonetheless, the G7 meeting is likely to be looked back on as
the start of serious currency realignment. The very weakness of the G7
statement is possibly part of the machinations to let the dollar decline
gently, for "no one" wants a drastic fall. |
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G7 gives us a provisional answer as to when and how the dollar will
decline (second leg starting now, and in a fairly controlled way). The
next question might be "to what point", but we must back off that one. A
question that is more possible to answer concerns interest rates. In
principle, fewer purchases of US bonds by foreign Central Banks will mean
that the US Treasury has to offer a higher interest rate to attract
buyers. Yet the adjustment in medium-term rates has already happened, as
it were, in anticipation of a weaker dollar. Medium-term rates are
therefore in a holding pattern with no break out from the trading range.
While deficit financing puts upward pressure on rates, doubts about the US
recovery and the stock market rally apply downward pressure. Our own
long-held argument that a robust recovery is held back by
over-indebtedness remains. Any "serious" recovery will increase rates,
dampening growth to a mediocre level - not enough, by the way, to solve
the jobless problem in the USA. |
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Might there be a third force acting on interest rates in the form
of the Fed buying medium-term Treasuries, despite denial of this last
July? It is all very possible, and leaves us in a difficult situation when
it comes to foreseeing the movement of the yield curve. On balance, we
believe dollar medium-term rates must rise even as the dollar declines. In
fact, we see rising rates as one of the means of slowing the decline of
the dollar. This leads us to repeat our conclusion of the last four weeks,
viz., that, apart from short-term trading opportunities, significant
lengthening of dollar durations should be delayed. |
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Likewise for the euro, although the probability in Euroland for
lower rates across the board is higher than in the USA. A rising currency,
especially when the rise is unwelcome, should encourage lower rates.
Trichet may be supposed to be less obsessed about a 2% inflation ceiling
than Duisenberg, and he has some room to lower the money-market rate. That
is a very different situation from the Fed's, who must be finding it
difficult to maintain the 1% anchor in place when there is such upward
pressure on bond yields. Thus we are still waiting, expecting our next
portfolio recommendation to be to lengthen in euros. |
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Data on foreign purchases of US bonds - the most important single
determinant of the dollar's strength - show the massive expansion of
Chinese and Japanese purchases. Less noticed is that the UK is the largest
single foreign purchaser of US bonds ($187 billion over the last 12
months, vs. 109 Japan and 73 China -source: Bridgewater). This largely
reflects the UK's involvement in fund management and a historical
orientation to the USA, but may reflect a little encouragement by the
Government to keep Sterling closer to the dollar than to the euro.
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Spreads in the emerging markets for Brazil, Venezuela and Turkey
have narrowed substantially, suggesting that profit taking should be
considered, as investors are doing in Russia. |
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Recommended average maturity for bonds in each currency
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We are still looking to lengthen in euros but not dollars.
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Currency: |
USD
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GBP
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EUR
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CHF
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As of
30.07.03 |
2006
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2006
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2006
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2006
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